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The Crimes
of Terrorism
T
errorism is a concept with a colloquial meaning
that lacks a consensus definition under international
law. An omnibus definition of the crime of terrorism
has eluded the international community to date largely
because of the now trite adage: ‘‘One man’s terrorist is another
man’s freedom fighter.’’ Indeed, many international instru-
ments condemning terrorism seem to carve out exceptions
for national liberation movements and groups struggling for
self-determination in the context of a history of colonialism
and oppression. For example, a 1991 UN General Assembly
Resolution denounced terrorism, but in virtually the same
breath, reaffirmed ‘‘the inalienable right to self-determination
and independence of people under colonial and racist and
other forms of alien domination and foreign occupation.’’1 As
a result of this normative ambivalence, codification efforts have
yielded a number of treaties that require states to criminalize
only specific terrorist acts (such as aircraft hijacking or attacks
against internationally protected persons).
Due in part to these definitional challenges, the architects
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) excluded the crime
of terrorism from the ICC Statute altogether. Nonetheless,
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vocal support for the crime’s eventual inclusion in the Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction remains. A number of terrorism
prosecutions are proceeding in domestic courts around the
world, and a hybrid court in Lebanon will be devoted to adju-
dicating terrorist crimes. As a result of the catastrophic attacks
of September 11, 2001, and subsequent events, countering the
threat of terrorism remains high on the agendas of individual
states and the international community. For these reasons,
we include this category of crimes within the ‘‘canon’’ of
international criminal law (ICL).
This chapter endeavors to identify the elements of terrorism
that distinguish it from other international crimes. It also con-
siders the way in which the phenomenon of terrorism at times
implicates and intersects with international humanitarian law
(IHL) and the prohibitions against war crimes. Finally, it
explores the extent to which terrorism crimes might be prose-
cutable before the ICC, notwithstanding that these crimes
were purposefully excised from the Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction.
TERRORISM UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although there have been efforts to codify a global prohibition
against terrorism under international law for decades, there is
no universal treaty or international instrument that defines the
crime of terrorism writ large. The League of Nations embarked
on the first major attempt in the modern era to prohibit the
crime of terrorism after the 1934 assassination by Croatian
separatists of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and others. The
treaty— the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment
of Terrorism (1937)—defined terrorism as follows: ‘‘All
criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calcu-
lated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular
7 The Crimes of Terrorism
186
persons or a group of persons or the general public.’’2 The treaty
attracted 24 state signatories; only India ultimately ratified the
Convention. The onset of World War II scuttled any further
efforts to bring the treaty into effect. After the dissolution of
the League of Nations, the treaty was never revived.
From this abortive start, the international community has
proceeded in a piecemeal fashion by criminalizing various
manifestations of terrorism (such as offenses committed on
board aircraft, crimes against internationally protected persons,
hostage taking, crimes involving maritime navigation, crimes
involving nuclear material, and the financing of terrorism),
often in response to particular terrorist incidents. In addition
to providing penal definitions, many of these treaties obligate
state parties to incorporate the relevant prohibitions into their
domestic criminal codes, to treat enumerated acts of terrorism
as extraditable offenses, to grant mutual legal assistance in the
investigation and prosecution of the proscribed acts, and to
either extradite or prosecute offenders pursuant to broad prin-
ciples of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In this regard, the crimes
of terrorism have been largely responsible for the greater accep-
tance of passive personality jurisdiction in international law, as
states increasingly assert jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts
of terrorism committed against their nationals.
This proliferation of definitions has led courts and com-
mentators to conclude that there is no established definition
of terrorism under customary international law. Nonetheless
many definitions of terrorism share certain basic structural
elements:
1. The perpetration of violence by enumerated or unenum-
erated means;
2. The targeting of innocent civilians or elements of the
civilian infrastructure;
3. Conduct is undertaken:
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a. With the intent to cause violence or with wanton
disregard for the act’s consequences;
b. For the purpose of causing fear or terror, coercing a
government, or intimidating an enemy;
c. To achieve some political, military, ideological, or
religious goal.
As you review the various definitions of terrorism provided in
your primary text or in the literature, try to identify common
and divergent elements. You will see that although many
instruments and penal codes addressing terrorism do not list
prohibited acts with specificity, most contain one or more
specific intent or motive element requiring proof of the exis-
tence of some mental state over and above the general intent to
commit acts of violence.* In some cases, this mental element is
aimed at the civilian population (the intent to cause terror) or a
government (the intent to influence a government). This
emphasis on the perpetrator’s motive markedly distinguishes
crimes of terrorism from other domestic and international
crimes.
Many multilateral instruments limit their application to
terrorism committed by nonstate actors, implicitly or explicitly
failing to recognize any notion of state terrorism. Thus, some
* In these formulations, it is often unclear if this mental element is the
equivalent of a specific intent requirement (along the lines of the definition of
genocide) or simply a required motive. Specific intent is generally defined as the
purpose that the perpetrator intends to accomplish by committing a specific
criminal act. Specific intent is usually a special mental element that is required
above and beyond any mental state associated with the underlying actus reus of
the crime. (For example, burglary— the breaking and entering into of a dwelling
of another— requires a showing of the specific intent to commit a felony therein.)
The concept of specific intent often elides with that of motive, which is the
guiding purpose or goal behind an individual’s criminal action. Normally, proof
of motive is not required for a criminal conviction, although proving the defen-
dant’s motive is often an integral part of any prosecution and is often relevant at
the time of sentencing. By contrast, the prosecution must prove the existence of
specific intent if it is an element of a crime. One exception to this general rule
involves hate crimes, which require proof that the defendant was motivated by
animosity toward a protected group.
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definitions—such as the one contained in the 1997 Terrorist
Bombing Convention—prohibit acts committed, inter alia,
against governmental facilities or public installations.3 Other
treaties limit their application to acts of ‘‘international terror-
ism,’’ thus implicitly excluding jurisdiction over acts of terror-
ism committed by substate actors operating solely within a
state. The Nuclear Terrorism Convention, for example, pro-
vides at Article 3 that
This Convention shall not apply where the offence is com-
mitted within a single State, the alleged offender and the
victims are nationals of that State, the alleged offender is
found in the territory of that State and no other State has
[grounds to assert territorial, nationality, and passive person-
ality jurisdiction].
By contrast, others treaties include no specific place or manner
restrictions.
The 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism in certain respects unifies these
various terrorism treaties. Article 2(1) of that treaty incorpo-
rates a number of extant treaties in its annex by providing that
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this
Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly,
unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the
intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that
they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out [any
violation of an annexed treaty].
In addition, the treaty prohibits
[a]ny other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury
to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in
the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the
purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate
a population, or to compel a government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.4
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This latter provision comes close to an omnibus definition of
the phenomenon. The Financing Convention is bolstered by a
Chapter VII Security Council Resolution passed in the weeks
following the attacks of September 11, 2001, requiring all
states to, inter alia, suppress the financing of acts of terrorism
and freeze financial assets of persons or entities involved in
terrorism.5
Since the 1990s, members of the United Nations have
been pushing for a truly Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism with a definition of terrorism that
would reconcile and harmonize the disparate definitions in
prior treaties. Such a convention, however, has yet to come
to fruition. More recently, the UN Security Council adopted
a resolution condemning the incitement of terrorist acts as
well as the justification or glorification thereof.6 It called on
‘‘all States to adopt such measures as may be necessary and
appropriate and in accordance with their obligations under
international law to:
(a) Prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or
acts;
(b) Prevent such conduct;
(c) Deny safe haven to any persons with respect to whom
there is credible and relevant information giving serious reasons
for considering that they have been guilty of such conduct.’’
Additionally, the resolution called on all states to strengthen
security at international borders and passenger screening facil-
ities, promote tolerance, and ‘‘prevent the subversion of edu-
cational, cultural, and religious institutions by terrorists and
their supporters.’’
None of the functioning international criminal tribunals
includes terrorism in its subject matter jurisdiction. The
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which is still under con-
struction, will be the first.7 The STL is a hybrid tribunal
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established by the United Nations and Lebanon to investigate
and prosecute those ‘‘responsible for the terrorist crime which
killed the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and
others.’’8 The Tribunal has a mandate to apply only the
domestic laws of Lebanon ‘‘relating to the prosecution and
punishment of acts of terrorism, crimes and offences against
life and personal integrity, illicit associations and failure to
report crimes and offences, including the rules regarding the
material elements of a crime, criminal participation and con-
spiracy.’’ Article 314 of the Lebanese Penal Code, one of
several terrorism-related provisions that may be litigated
before the STL, ‘‘defines ‘terrorist acts’ as all ‘acts designed
to create a state of alarm which are committed by means
such as explosive devices, inflammable materials, poisonous
or incendiary products or infectious or microbial agents likely
to create a public hazard.’ ’’9 The mens rea element requires
knowledge and a will to commit the terrorist act along with a
specific intent to create a state of alarm or fear. The STL is thus
a quasi-international tribunal effectively specializing in the law
of terrorism. As such, although it will be interpreting Lebanese
domestic law, the STL’s jurisprudence will no doubt be per-
suasive as other tribunals consider terrorism crimes in the
future.
TERRORISM WITHIN THE
ICC STATUTE
As originally envisioned, the ICC’s constitutive statute was to
be primarily procedural in nature, incorporating the ‘‘core’’
international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes by reference and as defined by customary
international law along with certain ‘‘treaty crimes’’ set forth in
discretemultilateral treaties already in existence, such as treaties
Terrorism Within the ICC Statute
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addressing terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, and
the like. To that end, nine of the terrorism treaties referenced
earlier (for example, those addressing terrorism against aircraft,
ships, hostages, and diplomats) were included in an annex to the
original ICC Statute.
Early on, delegates expressed concern that customary
international law alone would not define the relevant crimes
as clearly as would be necessary to provide adequate notice to
an accused pursuant to the principle of nullum crimen sine
lege. In addition, with respect to treaty crimes, delegates antic-
ipated that it would be necessary to confirm that the treaty
was in force with respect to the relevant states (e.g., the
territorial and nationality state) for a treaty crime prosecution
to proceed. These concerns led states to agree to set out
the operative definitions of all the crimes in the Statute (and
later adopt Elements of Crimes) rather than to incorporate
such crimes by reference to preexisting treaties or customary
international law.
As the negotiations proceeded at the 1998 Rome Confer-
ence, the treaty crimes eventually either fell out of the Statute,
as was the case with terrorism stricto sensu and drug trafficking,
or were incorporated into the core crimes, as was the case with
respect to crimes against internationally protected persons
(which are enumerated as war crimes at Article 8(2)(b)(iii))
and apartheid (which is listed as a crime against humanity at
Article 7(1)(j)). With respect to terrorism crimes, drafters artic-
ulated several reasons for eventually excluding these crimes
from the Statute altogether: (1) terrorism has no universally
accepted definition; (2) terrorism was not considered to be one
of ‘‘the most serious crimes of international concern’’ as con-
templated by Article 1; (3) at the time, terrorismwas not clearly
recognized as a crime under customary international law; (4)
including crimes of terrorism would unnecessarily politicize
the ICC; and (5) there are alternative domestic venues for
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terrorism prosecutions such that establishing international
jurisdiction would be unnecessary or duplicative. In addition,
delegates at the RomeConference were committed to conclud-
ing the treaty in five weeks, and the inclusion of terrorism was
proving to be a sticking point in the negotiations.
With respect to the politicization argument, states con-
tended that the inclusion of terrorism would impede ratifica-
tion of the Rome Statute for fear of politicized prosecutions
and proceedings, especially in cases in which states were bat-
tling subversive groups or internal rebellions. As one scholar
has noted, terrorism ‘‘is not only a phenomenon, it is also an
invective, and there are many examples of States using this
invective in a most subjective manner to de-legitimize and
demonize political opponents, associations or other States.’’10
This argument overlooks the fact that many of the crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court have significant political
ramifications, not the least of which is the crime of aggression.
Terrorism was also excluded under the rationale that
effective systems of national and international cooperation
are already in place for the prosecution of terrorism crimes.
Because governments are usually the direct or indirect target of
terrorist acts, states are highly motivated to prosecute crimi-
nally acts of terrorism, to cooperate with each other toward this
end, and to encourage the pursuit of civil actions by victims.
Indeed, as compared to the ‘‘atrocity crimes,’’ terrorism crimes
are more often incorporated into domestic penal codes and
are more frequently prosecuted by states. Given this observa-
tion, it was argued that the principle of complementarity would
likely prevent the prosecution of acts of terrorism before
the ICC in many cases.*Moreover, it was argued that effective
* The principle of complementarity is fundamental to the ICC framework
and provides that the Court will exercise jurisdiction only where the relevant
domestic authorities (for example, the territorial and nationality states) are either
unwilling or unable to prosecute offenders. Notably, complementarity is not
triggered, at least according to the plain text of Article 17, where the domestic
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counterterrorism requires ‘‘long-term planning, infiltration
into the organizations involved, the necessity of giving immu-
nity to some individuals involved, and so forth’’11—all func-
tions more effectively exercised by national jurisdictions than
an international court far from the events in question and the
relevant political milieu.
In the end, the final ICC Statute supports jurisdiction over
only the four core crimes, namely genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and the undefined crime of aggression.
Some drafters remained uneasy with this result and managed
to secure the adoption of Resolution E at the Rome Confer-
ence, which recommended that a review conference assemble
in 2009 or 2010 to consider the inclusion of the crime of ter-
rorism in the ICC Statute. As this Conference approaches,
many states and scholars continue to argue that terrorism
should eventually be included within the Court’s jurisdiction.
In particular, these advocates question the assumption made
during the Rome Conference—which occurred in 1998 prior
to the attacks of September 11, 2001— that terrorism is not a
serious crime of international concern. They argue that terror-
ism represents a substantial and growing threat, especially
given the possibility of attacks with nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons of mass destruction.
Although there is no question that the threat of terrorism
enjoys a greater level of international recognition and concern
since the RomeConference, the question of how best to address
terrorist crimes as a legal matter is still very much an open one.
One of the fundamental issues is whether the more established
international crimes currently within the jurisdiction of the ICC
adequately provide redress for terrorist acts, or whether there is a
jurisdictional lacunae that needs to be filled.
courts are overly zealous toward prosecutions or where the defendant’s due
process rights are potentially in jeopardy— two risks for terrorism prosecutions
where the state is the target of the acts in question.
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THE INTERFACE BETWEEN
TERRORISM AND WAR
One of the challenges to creating a penal regime for acts of
terrorism stems from the fact that the crimes encompassed
within the concept of terrorism sit at the intersection of the
jus ad bellum (governing the legality of the resort to armed force
ab inicio) and the jus in bello (governing the legality of the use
of armed force and the conduct of hostilities once an armed
conflict has been initiated). As was discussed in Chapter 6 on
the legal regulation of war, contemporary international law
treats these two bodies of law as conceptually distinct. Yet
acts of terrorism are often justified by the justness of the
cause on behalf of which they are committed. Indeed, there
remains a deep-seated unwillingness within segments of the
international community to fully relinquish the idea that
certain forms of otherwise prohibited violence are legitimate
if they are employed in opposition to a colonial, racist, alien,
occupying, or oppressive regime by a group seeking indepen-
dence or self-determination. In such situations of asymmetri-
cal power, an armed conflict fought ‘‘according to the rules’’
would undoubtedly result in a military victory for the dominant
power; thus, the apparent inevitability of terrorism. This also
explains the rhetorical persistence of the bromide ‘‘One man’s
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.’’
Likewise, a certain degree of uncertainty surrounds the
interface between the law governing the crimes of terrorism
and IHL. This is especially true where terrorists’ organizational
capabilities and destructive potential rival that of conventional
militaries. Acts that would be criminal under domestic law, or
would constitute acts of terrorism under the various treaty
prohibitions against terrorism, may be lawful acts of war
under IHL when committed within the context of an armed
conflict. This section attempts to untangle these two bodies of
law based on a series of scenarios.
The Interface Between Terrorism and War
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Violent Acts Committed Within
International Armed Conflicts
Imagine two signatories to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and their Protocols, Alpha and Beta, at war with each
other. Alpha’s troops launch two attacks against Beta’s
troops: one on a traditional battlefield along the border
between the two states and one against a military barracks
within Beta’s territory in the dead of night while Beta’s troops
are asleep. Both attacks by Alpha’s combatants against Beta’s
combatants are legitimate acts of warfare. Combatants repre-
senting nation states at war with each other are deemed
‘‘privileged belligerents,’’ which is to say that under IHL
they are entitled to use force against each other. Combatants
and military installations are lawful objects of attack. Assum-
ing the only individuals deliberately targeted are combatants,
and that appropriate levels of force and types of weaponry are
utilized, this attack generates no prosecutable event by Beta,
Alpha, or the international community. Presumably, if Beta
attempted to prosecute either of these acts as war crimes or
as violations of domestic law, the defendants would have a
strong defense of combat immunity that would find support
in IHL and trump domestic law as the lex specialis. Thus,
although we often think of the laws of armed conflict as
limiting the use of force, the same laws provide legal justi-
fication for certain acts of violence that would otherwise be
illegal outside of an armed conflict.
By contrast, imagine an attack by Alpha’s troops against a
civilian hospital that contained no Beta military personnel and
served no military purpose. A deliberate attack by Alpha’s com-
batants on Beta’s civilians (that is, noncombatants) and on a
civilian object in the context of an international armed conflict
is the quintessential war crime. The perpetrators of this act
remain privileged belligerents, but they become war criminals
when they deliberately misuse their military might against a
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protected class of persons or target. Alpha’s combatants may be
prosecuted for the war crimes of willfully killing protected
persons or the ‘‘extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly,’’ within the lexicon of the 1949
Geneva Conventions.12
Violent Acts Committed Outside
of Armed Conflict
Now, remove the state of war between Alpha and Beta, but
imagine there exists a nonviolent political conflict between the
two states over contested territory in Beta that is inhabited by
individuals who practice the same religion as the inhabitants of
Alpha. A deliberate armed attack on civilians hailing from Beta
by a radical group hailing from Alpha whose members are
motivated by some political or ideological purpose is the quin-
tessential terrorist act. Under current international treaties
governing terrorism, only the Terrorist Bombing Convention
is implicated by this scenario, and even then only if a ‘‘place of
public use,’’ ‘‘state or government facility,’’ ‘‘transportation sys-
tem,’’ or ‘‘infrastructure facility’’ is intentionally targeted using
an ‘‘explosive or other legal device’’ as those terms are defined
by the treaty. An attack on a civilian neighborhood would likely
not qualify.
EitherAlpha orBetawould beentitled to prosecute this act as
the crime of murder, or attempted murder, under their domestic
penal codes pursuant to the territorial or nationality principles of
jurisdiction, respectively. If the penal codes of Alpha and Beta
codify any crimes of terrorism or crimes against humanity, the
attackmayalso beprosecutable as suchunderdomestic law if the
elements of those crimes are met. Without the existence of an
armed conflict between the two states, IHL is not implicated and
no war crimes have been committed. Likewise, the perpetrators
The Interface Between Terrorism and War
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from Alpha are not entitled to prisoner of war status when cap-
tured or any form of combatant immunity if prosecuted.
The distinction between war crimes and acts of terrorism
seems relatively comprehensible under these scenarios. As
demonstrated later, once we start altering the operative vari-
ables, however, this categorization gets murkier.
The Initiation of an International Armed
Conflict
Going back to our situation involving the radicalized group from
Alpha, depending on how catastrophic the initial attack byAlpha
was, howorganized the perpetratorswere, andwhether thegroup
was under the overall control of the government of Alpha, this
violence may constitute the initiation of an international armed
conflict between the two states, thus triggering the application
of the IHL governing international armed conflicts and a right of
Beta to engage in self-defensewithin themeaning ofArticle 51of
the UN Charter. (An attack by an organized militia not under
the overall control of Alpha might constitute the initiation of a
noninternational armed conflict within Beta, as discussed more
fully later.)
Determining when IHL is initiated, and whether the rules
governing international or noninternational armed conflicts
apply, returns us to a topic in Chapter 6. Recall that the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in Tadic´ concluded that ‘‘an armed conflict exists
whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities
and organized armed groups or between such groups within a
State.’’13 The ICTY also noted that IHL applies ‘‘from the initi-
ationof sucharmedconflicts andextendsbeyond thecessationof
hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached.’’14 In
terms of conflict classification, an armed attack by the formal
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armed forces of Alpha would constitute the initiation of an
international armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2 of
the Geneva Conventions. Likewise, an attack by an informal
militia under the ‘‘overall control’’ of Alpha— the test devised
by the ICTY to establish the existence of an international
armed conflict—would also trigger the Geneva Conventions.*
This brings us full circle to our original IHL scenarios discussed
earlier. Once the IHL governing international armed con-
flicts applies, acts that would otherwise be criminal under
international or domestic law may become legitimate acts of
war. A deliberate attack on civilians, however, is never a lawful
act of war and could be prosecuted as a war crime.
Violent Acts Committed Within Noninter-
national Armed Conflicts
Another obvious amendment to our scenario involves entirely
internalizing the conflict. Imagine a civil war within Beta in
which citizens of Beta who practice the same religion as inha-
bitants of Alpha seek secession from Beta to achieve irreden-
tist aspirations to join Alpha. In the dark of night, the
secessionists attack Beta’s military barracks and a civilian
hospital.
The Geneva Conventions (by common Article 3) and Pro-
tocol II regulate military conduct in civil wars and other non-
international armed conflicts. The attack on the civilian
* These militia might not qualify for prisoner of war treatment, however, if
captured. Article 4 of Geneva III contemplates the involvement of ‘‘militias . . .
belonging to a [High Contracting] Party to the conflict and operating in or outside
their own territory’’ in addition to formal forces. To qualify as privileged belliger-
ents, and to be entitled to prisoner of war treatment, these militia must (a) be
commanded by a person responsible for his or her subordinates; (b) have a fixed
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) carry arms openly; and (d) conduct
their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
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hospital is prohibited by common Article 3* and Articles 4 and
13 of Protocol II, which protect persons who do not take direct
part in hostilities, including the civilian population. By con-
trast, neither instrument prohibits the attack on the military
barracks. (The penal consequences of these acts are discussed
later). Under IHL, Beta’s combatants remain legitimate objects
of attack even when they are not actively engaged in combat. In
other words, once the fact of an armed conflict is established,
members of the armed forces of a state are combatants, always
considered to be taking a direct part in hostilities and thus
targetable. It is only once they are officially hors de combat
as a result of illness, injury, capture, or surrender that comba-
tants may not be targeted. In our scenario, Beta’s combatants
have certainly ‘‘laid down their arms’’ for the night, but that
terminology is not meant to cover combatants who have simply
retired for the night. Indeed, the billeting of these combatants
in the barracks is not dispositive; these individuals could con-
ceivably be attacked in their homes as well, although IHL
would condemn the deaths of any civilians deliberately tar-
geted or the unintentional deaths of civilians if the force
* Common Article 3 reads in relevant part:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members
of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ‘‘hors de
combat’’ by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any
other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the
above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of
all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humil-
iating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a reg-
ularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
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used was disproportional to any military advantage to be gained
by attacking off-duty troops.
A rather unintuitive asymmetry in IHL reveals itself if we
alter our facts a bit. Imagine that as our secessionists attack
government troops, the government troops advance around
the perimeter and attack the secessionists from behind, causing
them to disband and scatter. Under IHL, this is a lawful act of
war. The secessionists are taking direct part in hostilities and, as
such, are lawful objects of attack. Further imagine that during
this confrontation, government troops identified particular
individuals during the attack who subsequently escaped
capture. Can government troops later track these individuals
down and kill them in their homes? The answer according to
Protocol II is no. Unlike the government troops mentioned
earlier, who are always considered to be taking direct part in
hostilities and are thus always targetable, our secessionists are
not technically combatants. As noncombatants, they may be
targeted only when they are taking direct part in hostilities
pursuant to Article 13(3) of Protocol II, which states ‘‘[c]ivilians
shall enjoy the protection afforded by this part [not to be tar-
geted], unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities.’’ This answer might change, however, if the seces-
sionists were billeted in a rebel camp somewhere in the territory
of the state, because this might still qualify as participation in
hostilities. The thorny question of when precisely noncomba-
tants ‘‘take a direct part in hostilities’’ is the subject of ongoing
discussions within the International Committee of the Red
Cross pursuant to a joint initiative with the T.M.C. Asser Insti-
tute in the Netherlands.
The Initiation of a Noninternational
Armed Conflict
To alter our scenario somewhat again, imagine the same
situation as given previously in which a group of individuals
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in Beta who practice the same religion as inhabitants of
Alpha desire secession from Beta to join Alpha. Assume
that, for the moment, this is merely a political and not an
armed conflict. Imagine that the group in Beta radicalizes
and eventually decides to utilize violence within Beta to draw
attention to their cause. Eventually, the group becomes more
and more organized and the violence escalates in terms of the
frequency and severity of attacks. At a certain point, the IHL
governing a noninternational armed conflict will begin to
apply.
Recall from Chapter 6 that common Article 3 and
Protocol II have different thresholds of applicability.*
The former requires simply an armed conflict ‘‘occurring
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,’’
with the ICTY defining ‘‘armed conflict’’ as ‘‘protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups.’’ The latter (at Article 1(1))
requires an armed conflict within the territory of a
party to the Conventions in which the nonstate actors
are under responsible command and exercise a degree
of control over the state’s territory that enables them
‘‘to carry out sustained and concerted military operations
and to implement [the] Protocol.’’ The Protocol at Article
1(2) makes clear that it does not apply to ‘‘situations of
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated
and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar
nature.’’ If our secessionists do not meet this standard—
for example, if they possess no territory or are not under
responsible command— their acts of violence will be gov-
erned only by common Article 3.
* In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (548 U.S. 557 (2006)), for example, the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that common Article 3 applied to the armed conflict
between the United States and al Qaeda.
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The Penal Consequences of Violent Acts
Committed Within Noninternational
Armed Conflicts
Classic IHL, as derived from the four Geneva Conventions of
1949 and their Protocols, would treat all these events quite
differently than would modern IHL in terms of their penal
consequences. Most important, although the Geneva Conven-
tions identify a list of ‘‘grave breaches’’ that constitute war
crimes under IHL, neither common Article 3 nor Protocol II
creates or mandates the domestic creation of a penal regime for
noninternational armed conflicts. As a result, if we consider
only the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, any penal
liability for acts of violence committed within a noninter-
national armed conflict would be governed by domestic law.
So, assuming that Beta has domestically incorporated the
Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, but gone no further,
the killing by the secessionists of civilian patients in the hos-
pital and members of Beta’s military quartered in their barracks
would be treated as acts of ordinary murder by Beta’s author-
ities. The crimes against both targets may thus be treated
exactly the same; it is of no moment that the military barracks
would be a lawful object of attack within the context of an
international armed conflict. The classic treaty law governing
noninternational armed conflicts entitles states to treat our
secessionists as common criminals rather than privileged bel-
ligerents. Individuals who are not considered privileged belli-
gerents under IHL are not entitled to combatant immunity for
what would otherwise be lawful acts of war. Nor, for that
matter, need they be treated as prisoners of war when they
are captured, but the state’s standard constitutional and
human rights protections would still apply.
Some states have gone beyond their treaty obligations and
domestically penalized certain violations of the Geneva treaty
provisions governing noninternational armed conflicts. The
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United States did so with the passage of the 1996 War Crimes
Act.* The original version of that statute defined war crimes to
include acts that constitute ‘‘a violation of common Article 3 of
the international conventions signed at Geneva, 12 August
1949, or any protocol to such convention to which the United
States is a party and which deals with non-international armed
conflict.’’ Common Article 3(1)(a) prohibits ‘‘violence to life
and person, in particular murder of all kinds’’ when committed
against a person ‘‘taking no active part in the hostilities, includ-
ing members of armed forces who have laid down their arms.’’
As codified as a war crime in U.S. law, this provision would
render the secessionists’ attack against the civilian hospital the
war crime of violence to life and murder. (The attack could also
be prosecuted as ordinary murder under U.S. law.) Because
common Article 3 does not prohibit the attack on the govern-
ment barracks, it would generate no criminal liability under the
U.S. war crimes statute. It, too, however, could be prosecuted
under the domestic penal code.
Modern developments in IHL have significantly expanded
the concept of war crimes. In particular, the statutes of the two
ad hoc criminal tribunals, and the jurisprudence thereunder,
significantly collapsed the distinction between international
and noninternational armed conflicts in terms of the penal
consequences of acts of violence within the latter. In so
doing, the tribunals now regularly prosecute violations of treaty
provisions that are not identified as crimes by the treaties
* The original version of the War Crimes Act of 1996 criminalized all viola-
tions of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions so long as they were
committed by or against a member of the Armed Forces of the United States
or a national of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(3). A subsequent amend-
ment to this statute by the Military Commission Act of 2006 decriminalized
certain violations of common Article 3, namely ‘‘(c) outrages upon personal dig-
nity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment’’ and ‘‘(d) the passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pro-
nounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.’’
7 The Crimes of Terrorism
204
themselves. For example, the general prohibition against
inflicting terror on a population appears in the Additional
Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions at Article 51(2)
in Additional Protocol I and Article 13(2) in Additional
Protocol II.* In Prosecutor v. Galic´, the ICTY had occasion
to interpret these provisions when the prosecution charged
the defendant with ‘‘inflicting terror on the civilian population’’
as a war crime under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute (providing
for jurisdiction over an exemplary list of ‘‘violations of the laws
and customs of war’’). Even though neither of these provisions
contemplates individual criminal liability or defines ‘‘spreading
terror’’ as a criminal offense, the ICTY nonetheless convicted
the defendants of the charged crime. In particular, the ICTY
identified the following elements of the crime of inflicting
terror on the civilian population:
(i) Acts of violence directed against the civilian popula-
tion or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities
causing death or serious injury to body or health within the
civilian population.
(ii) The offender willfully made the civilian population or
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities the
object of those acts of violence.
(iii) The above offence was committed with the primary
purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population.15
The tribunals’ approach to war crimes in noninternational
armed conflicts was largely adopted and codified by the ICC
Statute at Article 8.* This suggests an emergent customary
* These provisions identically provide that ‘‘[t]he civilian population as such, as
well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of
violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian pop-
ulation are prohibited.’’ Article 4(2) of Protocol II also prohibits ‘‘acts of terrorism’’
against civilians or others hors de combat as a Fundamental Guarantee.
* Domestic war crimes statutes are increasingly following suit as states
adjust their penal codes after ratification of the ICC Statute. This suggests
that customary international law now recognizes the possibility of war crimes
being committed within noninternational armed conflicts.
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international law set governing the commission of war crimes
in noninternational armed conflicts. Most states, however,
could not prosecute for such acts without first incorporating
these prohibitions into their domestic penal codes.
PROSECUTING ACTS OF TERRORISM
BEFORE THE ICC
Despite the clear omission of terrorism from the Rome Statute,
arguments exist that the Court could adjudicate certain acts
that one might also consider acts of terrorism within its existing
subject matter jurisdiction. This is because in certain situa-
tions, acts of terrorism may satisfy the elements of other
international crimes. As exemplified earlier, the high degree
of intersection between acts of terrorism and war crimes sug-
gests that the former may be prosecutable before the ICC and
other international tribunals with jurisdiction over war crimes.
Considering our scenarios involving states Alpha and Beta,
the ICC could consider Alpha’s attack on the hospital, if com-
mitted during an international armed conflict, to qualify as the
following war crimes, inter alia, within the Rome Statute:
 Willful killing (Article 8(2)(a)(i));
 Violence to life and persons (Article 8(2)(a)(iii);
 Extensive destruction of property . . . not justified by
military necessity (Article 8(2)(a)(iv));
 Intentionally attacking civilians (Article 8(2)(b)(i));
 Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects
(Article 8(2)(b)(ii)); or
 Intentionally directing attacks against hospitals (Article
8(2)(e)(iv)).
Likewise, if the attack on the hospital occurred within the
context of a noninternational armed conflict, the following
provisions may be applicable:
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 Violence to life and person, in particular murder (Article
8(2)(c)(i));
 Intentionally directing attacks against civilians (Article
8(2)(e)(i)); or
 Intentionally attacking hospitals (Article 8(2)(e)(iv)).
Note that neither Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I nor
Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II was included in these
lists.
None of the provisions of Article 8 penalizes the attack on
the military barracks, whether committed in an international or
noninternational armed conflict. The targeting of a military
objective is generally a lawful act of war; however, it becomes
a war crime where disproportionate force is used such that
there is an incidental loss of life, long-term or severe environ-
mental damage, or superfluous injury.* Absent this, any pros-
ecution of the barracks attack would have to occur before
domestic courts under domestic law.
In addition to these war crimes, where violent acts (such as
murder, torture, or kidnapping) are committed within the con-
text of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population, they may constitute crimes against humanity
under Article 7. The definition of crimes against humanity
in the ICC Statute requires proof that the attack was ‘‘pursuant
to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to com-
mit such attack’’ (Article 7(2)(a)). Presumably many terrorist
groups could be shown to possess such a policy to attack civi-
lians. Terrorist attacks may also implicate the prohibition
against genocide, where the acts target a protected group
with the intent to destroy that group. Although there are
many instances of acts of terrorism being directed against a
* Article 8 prohibits the use of weapons that cause unnecessary or super-
fluous suffering, such as poison or poisoned weapons, asphyxiating gases, or
so-called dum dum bullets (bullets that expand on impact). See ICC Statute,
Articles 8(2)(b)(xvii)-(xx).
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protected group (such as those committed during ‘‘the troubles’’
in Northern Ireland or even the attacks of September 11,
2001), it may be difficult to prove the specific intent to commit
genocide as opposed to the intent to intimidate or coerce a
government— the hallmark of terrorism.
Isolated or exceptional violent acts, committed in times of
peace (or without any nexus to an armed conflict) and absent
more systemic repression might not be considered a war crime
or a crime against humanity. Prosecuting such acts at the
international level may require the existence of a stand-alone
crime of terrorism. As you review the terrorism materials in
your course, and the degree of normative redundancy in
ICL, reflect on whether terrorism crimes should be expressly
included within the Rome Statute or whether such acts are
better prosecuted before domestic courts. In addition, given
the clear intent of the majority of drafters to exclude crimes of
terrorism from the ICC, consider to what extent the ICC
should apply its existing crimes to acts that would otherwise
be considered acts of terrorism under the terrorism treaties or
pursuant to an emerging customary international law
prohibition.
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